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**A MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST GANGS:
INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES BY ACTIVE DUTY FORCES**

**A Monograph
by
Major David R. Hogg
Armor**

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
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ABSTRACT

A MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST GANGS: INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES BY ACTIVE DUTY FORCES

by MAJ. David R. Hogg, USA, 51 pages.

This study examines the historical precedents and the laws that allow federal troops to combat domestic enemies, the current environment that may call for the use of active duty forces, and a model that can be used to deal with domestic disturbances within the United States.

There are three Constitutional laws and two unwritten laws that give the President the authority to commit federal forces to quell a domestic disturbance. In addition to these laws, there are two laws that limit the President's use of these federal forces in a domestic situation.

Street gangs are analyzed using a methodology developed by Bard E. O'Neill. This methodology shows that street gangs are a form of Preservationist insurgency. After identifying the threat (street gangs), the Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) model is analyzed and used to establish a base for planning a campaign.

The conclusion of this study is that street gangs and the associated domestic violence is a threat to the United States, but not an organized military or political threat, that is unified under one individual. It is a state problem that may require federal assistance in the forms of law enforcement, economic aid, social aid and military support.

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I. INTRODUCTION

*"...To Protect And Defend The Constitution Of The United States
Against All Enemies, Foreign And Domestic..."¹*

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The United States Military has a long history of protecting the vital interests of the United States from foreign enemies abroad. Not as well recognized is the use of active duty forces to deal with domestic disturbances. When the public hears of the use of military forces in the United States, it is almost always associated with humanitarian aid such as the Hurricane Andrew disaster in southern Florida. The use of military forces to control domestic disturbances is not normally due to a threat to the national security, but a threat to either the state or the individual rights as defined by the Constitutional of the United States.

This study will examine the historical precedents and the laws that allow federal troops to combat domestic enemies, the current environment that may call for the use of active duty forces, and a model that can be used to deal with domestic disturbances within the United States.

DIRECTION OF RESEARCH EFFORT

For initial research, this paper will examine the laws that allow for and limit the use of federal forces in domestic disturbances. The primary source of information is the Constitution of the United States, which identifies the basic powers of the President. In addition to the Constitutional laws, which grant the President the authority to use federal forces in domestic situations, there are laws that limit the use of federal forces, such as the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. In discussing

each of these laws, a historical perspective and examples are provided. These historical examples establish the bases for the use of federal troops in domestic disturbances.

The next focus of this research project is the identification and examination of domestic situations or threats that could result in the employment of federal forces either on a state or national level. Problems associated with street gangs are applicable. In examining this problem, I use a model to show that street gangs are a form of insurgency. The primary sources in this analysis are *FM 100-20, Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict* and Bard E. O'Neill's book *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*.

After identifying the threat I determine how to combat this threat and what level of federal involvement is needed, using the Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) model. The IDAD model provides a possible solution to the development of a plan to combat street gang insurgency.

RESEARCH QUESTION

The primary research question of this study is whether the United States Army could conduct an internal security campaign to combat street gangs, and if so, what are the possible implications and problems associated with these actions?

From this primary question, secondary questions arise. These secondary questions are:

- (1) Is it conceivable that the United States will call upon the U.S. Army to actively support federal, state, and city law enforcement

agencies in the conduct of internal security actions here in the United States?

(2) Is the Army prepared to conduct internal security operations?

(3) Does the Army have the doctrine to successfully conduct internal security operations?

(4) Can street gangs be considered a type of insurgent force?

(5) Do the laws need to be changed to allow for the use of active army units in a direct action or supporting role?

PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RESEARCH

Analysis of the primary and secondary research questions identified a few problems. First, using active duty forces to fight a domestic insurgency within the United States is a very sensitive subject. Secondly, it is difficult to verify the idea that street gangs are a form of an insurgency. Finally, it must be determined whether street gangs constitute an internal threat to our national well being or only to specific states. The level of the street gang threat provides a significant bearing on the results of this study.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

A recent report by Senator Joseph Biden records that the 1990's have produced a record amount of violent crimes such as murder, rape, robbery and assault.² "1.8 million Americans were either murdered, raped, robbed or assaulted" during 1990 alone.³ The report attributes this rise in violent crime to the increase in assault styled weapons and even more dramatically, "drug-fueled gang violence."⁴ The increase in gangs and gang related murders has increased so much that even smaller cities have gang problems. Gang membership is estimated at

being over 90,000 members in Los Angeles county alone. The rate of increase in the national number of gang members in a five year period has doubled and crime has tripled,⁵ while federal funds directed towards law enforcement have actually been cut. In fact, state and local law enforcement agencies have only increased by 2%.⁶ To put the problem in perspective, in 1990, for every three violent crimes committed there was less than one law enforcement officer to deal with the crimes.⁷

In an attempt to combat the street gang problem the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) made the "single largest reallocation of resources in the bureau's history"⁸ by moving 300 agents from counterintelligence work to the investigation of street gangs.⁹ Of these 300 agents, 22 are being sent to Los Angeles to join a 12 member gang task force.

Along with the changes in the F.B.I., the increase in domestic violence and the identification of street gangs as a form of insurgency could conceivably require the use of federal military forces to support either national or state law enforcement agencies. This idea defines the overall significance of this study.

II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research for this analysis is accomplished in five steps (see figure 1). The study begins with an analysis of the legal and historical basis for the internal use of federal forces in the United States. The research methodology continues with an examination of the nature of insurgency and outlines the criteria needed to analyze an insurgent movement. This section centers around Bard E. O'Neill's book *Insurgency &*

Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare and *FM 100-20, Military Operation In Low Intensity Conflict*. Each of these resources provides an in-depth look at the causes and analysis of insurgency. The




Figure 1 - Research Methodology

criteria used to examine and evaluate an insurgency are: the insurgent's goal, the insurgent's means, the insurgent's strategy, the environment, popular support, organization and unity, and extended support.¹⁰ The third step of the methodology is applying the criteria for analyzing an insurgency to the street gangs to show that they could be considered a type of insurgency. The fourth step is the application of the Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) model to develop a campaign format.

Finally, the study culminates with analysis and conclusions on the possible affects on American society should a military campaign be waged against street gangs at either the National or State level.

III. THE LAW OF THE LAND

*"From And After The Passage Of This Act It Shall Not Be Lawful To Employ Any Part Of The Army Of The United States As A Posse Comitatus ..."*¹¹

The use of federal military forces in domestic disturbances is an issue that is embedded in both the Constitution of the United States as well as specific statutes and federal laws. The power to use federal troops is vested with the President of the United States. As the Commander and Chief of all armed forces, he is the individual that initiates the use of federal troops, both internally and externally to the United States. However, the ability of the President to use federal troops is linked to three specific situations.

The first article of the Constitution that gives the President the authority to use federal forces is Article II, section 3. Specifically, this article states that the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United State."¹² In essence, this stipulates that the President is responsible to ensure that the laws of the federal government are followed. In making sure that the laws of the federal government are followed by the states,

the President can employ federal troops as well as federalize the National Guard. The first use of this article and the first time that federal forces were used to quell a domestic disturbance was in 1794, during the Whiskey Insurrection.¹³

The Whiskey Insurrection occurred in March 1791 in western Pennsylvania and was instigated by an increase of an excise tax of ten cents per gallon of whiskey and additional taxes on the stills used to make the whiskey. At that time, one out of five farmers in western Pennsylvania operated a whiskey still.¹⁴ The farmers argued that the tax was unfair and that it was not uniform throughout the United States because not all States relied on whiskey to produce income.¹⁵

From 1791 until 1793, the politicians of Pennsylvania attempted to repeal the tax through political means. However, some of the more radical farmers resorted to threats of tar and feathering for anyone who complied with the tax law and anyone associated with collecting the tax, specifically federal tax inspectors. In 1793, the federal government resorted to seizing whiskey that did not have the proper excise tax imposed on it. This escalated the friction between the farmers and the Federal government. In an attempt to defuse the tension, the federal government in June of 1794 gave Pennsylvania the authority to collect the whiskey tax as well as prosecute anyone who failed to pay the tax. This change in the law did not completely defuse the situation since the

law was not retroactive. Eventually the enforcement of the law led to confrontation between state, federal officials and non-complying citizens.

The climax of this event and the first use of federalized forces to quell a domestic disturbance occurred in 4 August 1794 when Judge Wilson issued a certificate that stated the following:

the laws of the United States are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the power vested in the Marshal of the district.¹⁶

This set in motion the deployment of federal and state forces led personally by President Washington against the rebellious citizens of Pennsylvania. The rebellion was quickly put down with minimum loss of life and Article II, section 3 of the Constitution was validated.

The second relevant article is Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution. This article states:

the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.¹⁷

This stipulates that the President at the specific request of a state can commit federal troops or federalize the National Guard of that state or of other states as required, to confront an invasion or to deal with domestic violence or disturbances. The request from the state must come from either the State's Legislation or the Governor if the State's Legislation is unable to meet in session. This request is required under the

Constitution for the President to commit federal troops.¹⁸ Further, the President is not bound to commit federal forces even after receiving such a request from a state. An example of the use of this specific article occurred during the riots of 1877.

The riots of 1877 were a result of local depressions in the economy which directly affected the railroads. The revenue received by the railroads were dramatically cut due to the depressed economy. To compensate for the loss in revenue, the railroads reduced the wages of the workers, which in turn resulted in violent strikes across the nation.¹⁹

Many states experienced problems with the railroad strikes, however, the first state to experience these strikes was Martinsburg, West Virginia. Two years before the riots, the State Legislature of West Virginia had eliminated the need for a militia. Because of this, West Virginia did not have a volunteer force that could deal with the problems of the striking railroad workers as they disrupted the running of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.²⁰ At the request of the Governor of West Virginia, President Hayes ordered soldiers from the Washington Arsenal and Fort McHenry to Martinsburg. The proclamation from the President went out to the 250 strikers, who left West Virginia without any more violence.

The use of federal forces during the riots of 1877 exemplifies the fact that a governor can request federal assistance if an emergency necessitates federal forces to quell a domestic disturbance.

The Fourteenth Amendment is the third and last of the Constitutional Laws that allows the President to use federal troops internally in the United States. This Amendment states the following:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.²¹

If a State denies any individual their rights, as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment, then the President has the right to enforce the Constitution with federal troops if necessary. This amendment was used extensively during the civil rights movement in the late 50's through the 60's. One of the first incidents took place in Little Rock, Arkansas on 24 September 1967.

In an attempt to guarantee the rights of certain citizens of the United States, a desegregation law was enacted. To enforce a federal court order to integrate Little Rock High School, the President had to federalize the entire Arkansas National Guard and deploy federal forces to Little Rock. The federalized forces provided the protection of the citizens and enforced the court order from 1957 to 1958.²² This was one of four separate incidents in the support of the civil rights movement in which the President used federal forces to protect the Fourteenth amendment rights of black Americans.

In addition to the Constitutional Law, there are other unwritten law for justifying the use of federal troops in domestic situations. The first of these unwritten laws is the "inherent right and duty of the President to protect federal property and functions."²³ Another unwritten law is the responsibility of a military commander to protect federal property and defeat an insurrection on his/her own initiative, but only under emergency conditions.²⁴ An emergency condition is one that does not allow enough time to receive instructions from a higher headquarters because of the dangerous nature of the domestic disturbance. An historical example of the use of these unwritten laws was in 1906 by Maj. General Frederick Funston.

During the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, Maj. General Funston ordered federal troops from their post in San Francisco into the streets to protect public and private property. The earthquake had disrupted communications so that Maj. General Funston could not communicate with Washington. The situation became serious with rioters and looters attempting to take advantage of the natural disaster. Maj. General Funston took the initiative, ordered federal troops into the streets and proceeded to restore law and order in the area.²⁵

Along with the laws that give the President the authority to use federal forces, there are two specific laws that limit the President's internal use of federal troops in the United States. The first is the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and the second is the law which prohibits the use of federal troops in "connection with elections."²⁶

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 specifically forbids the use of federal forces to enforce or execute the laws of a state or federal

government, unless Congress or the Constitution authorizes such action. This law was passed towards the end of Reconstruction after the American Civil War. Prior to this, federal forces were used as law enforcement officials, tax collectors and other government and state positions. Public reaction towards this use of federal forces prompted Congress to enact the following law:

From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress; and no money appropriated by this act shall be used to pay any of the expenses incurred in the employment of any troops in violation of this section and any person willfully violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.²⁷

In 1980 the Posse Comitatus was amended to allow the use of federal forces in supporting law enforcement officials. It still restricted the use of federal forces in conducting arrest, seizures and searches.

Another relevant law prohibits the use of federal forces at polling places. This law was established because it was felt that the presence of federal forces at the polling places would favor the politicians in office. During the elections of 1876 in South Carolina and Louisiana, federal forces were deployed to insure the security of the polling places. The Democrats were short a few members that would ensure their control of both the House and the Senate. The elections in both of these states went with no immediate problems. When the Republicans won in both Louisiana and South Carolina, however, the Democrats reacted. What

proceeded was a political uproar with the Democrats claiming unfair influence by the Republicans. Spurred by this protest, and the subsequent problems associated with these elections, the use of federal forces at the polling places was prohibited by law. Today, federal forces can only be used at an election polling place for the purpose of protection from insurrection, should the need arise.

IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INSURGENCY?

"Insurgencies Have Specific Causes And Beginnings. The United States Must Understand The Motives And Objectives Of The Insurgent..."²⁸

INTRODUCTION

An insurgency is defined by Bard E. O'Neill as:

a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resource (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.²⁹

This differs slightly from the Department of Defense's definition that an insurgency is "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict."³⁰ Both of these definitions lock on to the concept that an insurgency's primary goal is political change and legitimacy for the insurgent movement. The big question is whether or not an insurgency must be politically motivated to be a true insurgency.

In Bard E. O'Neill's book, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside the Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, he identifies seven different types of insurgent movements. These different types of insurgency are:³¹

Anarchist. The anarchist movement is based on the complete elimination of the ruling political party and everything associated with it. They believe that the "superordinate - subordinate"³² relationships associated with the political party to be illegitimate and unnecessary. This is a revolutionary type insurgency because it advocates the complete overthrow of the current government. An example of this type of insurgency is the Black Cell in West Germany that existed in the 1970s.

Egalitarian. The egalitarian movement is based on radical change of the social system. It looks at distributing the wealth of a country through centralized control. This is also a revolutionary type insurgency because it advocates the complete overthrow of the current government based on violence and a Marxist mentality. An example of this type of insurgency is the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of Peru.

Traditionalist. The traditionalist movement is based on the removal of the current political system, through the compliance of cultural, religious and/or ancestral type traditions. This form of insurgency attempts to resort to a form of political system that had existed in the recent past. Because of the desire to completely change the political system this is also a revolutionary type insurgency. An example of this type of insurgency is the current Muslim Brotherhood in Syria which is more of a reactionary - traditionalist insurgency because of their radical and ancient views.

Pluralist. Unlike the first three insurgencies, Pluralist are not authoritarian in nature. This movement is based on the "values of individual freedom, liberty, and compromise ... political structures are differentiated and autonomous."³³ Of the four revolutionary type insurgencies, this is the least used. An example of this type of insurgency is the current UNITA movement in Angola.

Secessionist. The secessionist movement is much more radical than the revolutionary type insurgencies because the movement attempts to completely separate from the current political system. This breakaway group desires a completely autonomous political community and does not attempt to change the current political system. An example of this type of insurgency is the American Civil War of 1861, with the South's attempt to break away from the North.

Reformist. The reformist movement is one of the least violent and ambitious of the insurgencies. The reformist's only desire is for more political, social and economic benefits from the system. This group is not attempting radical change other than equal opportunity across the board. An example of a reformist movement is the Miskito Indians in Nicaragua.

Preservationist. Preservationist movement, unlike the other insurgencies, desires no change to the political, social or economic system. Instead this type of insurgency conducts attacks against "non-ruling groups and authorities"³⁴ who are trying to change the system. The preservationist movement derives benefits from the current system and therefore block attempts to structurally change the system. An example of this type of movement is the right wing death squads in the

Latin American Countries. This type of insurgency does not fit the definition of FM 100-20. It does, however, fit the O'Neill definition.

After determining what kind of insurgency a nation is facing, the next step is to begin an indepth study of the insurgency, starting with identifying the insurgent's goals.

ANALYZING AN INSURGENCY - THE GOAL

In examining an insurgency, the first step is to determine the insurgent movement's ultimate goal. By analyzing the goals, it is possible to determine which type of insurgent movement is involved. It is critical to know what type of enemy you are fighting to determine how to counter the movement. Determining the goal of an insurgency is not always easy. There are four problems associated with identifying an insurgent's goals: goal transformation, goal conflict, misleading rhetoric, and goal ambiguity.

When the ultimate goal of an insurgent movement changes based on the leadership of the movement, goal transformation occurs. As leaders change, goals change. Goal transformation normally produces a change in the type of insurgency, e.g., changing from a secessionist movement to a reformist movement.³⁵

Goal conflict occurs when different factions within the insurgent movement each have different goals or objectives. A recent example of goal conflict is the current Palestinian movement which has egalitarian, traditionalist and pluralist elements in it.³⁶

Misleading rhetoric is another problem. When an insurgent movement spouts democratic ideals and then actually conducts itself in a harsh, authoritative manner, this type of problem is evident.

Misleading rhetoric requires a close analysis of the insurgent's internal actions, while disregarding political rhetoric.³⁷ This analysis must be done first in order to properly identify the insurgent's objective or goal.

The fourth problem with identifying the insurgent's goal is called goal ambiguity. This type of problem exists when a movement has two or more equally important goals. This leads to problems in trying to determine the true nature and aims of the organization.³⁸

Despite these problems in identifying the goals of any insurgent movement, it is the basic starting point when analyzing the type of insurgent movement. Once the ultimate goal of the insurgency is identified, the means and type of warfare the organization is using can be determined.

THE INSURGENT'S MEANS

An insurgent may use a variety of different means to accomplish his/her goals. These include the use of the political system and different forms of violence. Political means available to an organization include propaganda, protest demonstrations, recruitment of cadres, infiltration of the current political system, and outside support or assistance. The insurgent can also help the population by providing some type of needed service and finally putting together strategies and plans.³⁹ The different types of violence used by an insurgency vary from terrorism, guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare or a combination of two or more. A "form of warfare may be viewed as one variety of organized violence emphasizing particular armed forces, weapons, tactics, and targets."⁴⁰ The most common forms of warfare are terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Often an insurgent will use a combination of violent acts to support their cause.

Regardless of the type of warfare used, it is important to identify the purpose of the attacks, the targets, the activities involved and the overall scale of the insurgent organization, so that countermeasures can be established.

THE INSURGENT'S STRATEGY

In any insurgency there is a strategy that the organization feels will enable them to achieve their goal. These strategies can be broken down into four different groups: the conspiratorial strategy, the strategy of protracted popular war, the military focus strategy, and the urban warfare strategy.⁴¹

Conspiratorial strategy attempts to overcome the current political structure through the swift use of force. This is one of the oldest types of strategies, and is conspiratorial because it is characterized by coups conducted by disgruntled military leaders or civilians who are not part of the political elite.⁴²

The strategy of protracted popular war is the classic Maoist approach using three different stages. Political organization is the key. The first stage, strategic defense, relies on the use of low-level violence to buy time to build up political support and strength. The second stage, strategic stalemate, relies on the use of guerrilla warfare. The third stage is the strategic offense. During this stage the insurgency transitions into mobile conventional warfare.⁴³

The military-focus strategy is different from the strategy of protracted popular war in that it relies on military action as the primary means to accomplish the organization's goals with political action being secondary.⁴⁴ In this strategy the insurgency relies on military action to

bring in the popular support needed. In addition, with this strategy the support of the population is not needed if the current government's forces are defeated.

The urban-warfare strategy is the last of the four strategies that an insurgent force can use. This strategy relies on the use of violent actions to force the government to resort to extreme measures. As a result of the government's action, the insurgent receives popular support from the masses. This form of strategy has evolved in modern societies due to the lack of rural areas. In countries that have a mix of urban - rural areas, the inability of the insurgent force to get popular support in the countryside leads them into the urban areas.

The type of strategy used by an insurgent will often be directly related to the insurgent's environment. The environment will often dictate to the insurgent the need for a specific strategy or combination of strategies.

THE ENVIRONMENT

The analysis of the insurgent's environment includes both human and physical dimensions. The human dimensions of an insurgent's organization include such items as demographic distribution, social structure, economic factors, political culture, and the political system. The physical dimension includes areas such as terrain, communication and transportation networks, and climate. These will all play a role in the structure and effectiveness of the insurgent's organization. This analysis will also identify the root causes of the insurgency. As with any organization, it cannot effectively exist without some form of popular

support. This is the next area that must be analyzed when dealing with insurgencies.

POPULAR SUPPORT

The role of popular support to an insurgent's organization is critical to six of the seven types of insurgencies. There are two types of popular support, passive and active.

Passive support includes those individuals or communities that do not provide direct assistance, either with manpower or materials, to the insurgency. Passive supporters do not provide information to the authorities on the activities of the insurgency, hence they inhibit the ability of the government to counter the insurgent movement.

Active supporters are those individuals and communities that are willing to risk direct involvement with the government. This active support includes anything from providing material to personnel support. Without active support from the population an insurgency is doomed to failure. Because of this fact, the insurgents use a variety of techniques to get active support. These include but are not limited to charismatic attraction, esoteric appeals, terrorism, provocation of government repression, demonstrations of potency, and finally, coercion. An insurgent organization may use one or a combination of these techniques to obtain some form of popular support.

ORGANIZATION AND UNITY

As with any organization, there must be some form of structure and unity of the movement is going to be effective. An insurgent's structure can be based on a variety of different techniques. FM 100-20 identifies four basic structures. The four basic structure are:¹⁵

Subversive: The subversive organization exists when the insurgents use the political system to get their own members elected into office. Many times selective force and coercion are used to intimate voters and to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the current regime.

Critical Cell: The critical cell organization also infiltrates the current government and political system by establishing a shadow government. This structure attempts to destroy the system from within through both covert and overt measures. Once a government has been weakened, the insurgents will make their move to grasp power from the legitimate government.

Mass Oriented: The mass oriented organization is different from the previous two organizations in that it attempts to win by organizing outside of the current governmental system. This type of organization attempts to gain both political and armed *legitimacy* through large scale popular support.

Traditional: The traditional organization is based on limited grievances and festers from the lack of government response. This type of organization is limited to a specific "tribal, racial, religious, linguistic, or other similar identifiable group."⁴⁶

An insurgency can use each one of these organizations or can modify and adapt them to meet their specific needs. The type of organization will determine the type of government response required to disrupt the unity of the movement. The unity of an insurgency is a critical element for the success or failure of the movement. Without unity, the cohesion and sense of direction for the organization is disrupted. Once

disrupted, it becomes ineffective and subject to defeat by the government.

EXTENDED SUPPORT

Extended support is nothing more than outside support. Without some type of outside support an insurgent organization can have a difficult time trying to provide the necessary materiel and other means to accomplish its objectives. Outside support is as critical to an insurgency as popular support.⁴⁷

CONCLUSION

The ability to properly analyze an insurgency is the key step in developing an effective counterinsurgency campaign. To properly do this one must first identify the ultimate goal of the insurgent's organization. Once the insurgent's goals are isolated, the means and strategy of the organization must be identified and examined. Finally, the environment, popular support, organization, unity and any extended support must also be examined. Once this has been completed, it is possible to develop a campaign plan or strategy to begin neutralizing and eventually eliminating the insurgent.

The following section will closely examine the street gang problem. Analyzing street gangs according to the format from this section, I will demonstrate that they are a type of insurgent organization.

V. STREET GANGS - A MODERN DAY INSURGENCY

*"They Cut Off His Head, Put His Body In A Car And Set Fire To It. He Was Buried Yesterday Without His Head. We're Still Looking For It."*⁴⁸

INTRODUCTION

One of the biggest threats faced by American inner cities and the surrounding communities is street gangs and the violence and drugs associated with those gangs.⁴⁹ Gangs have always been around, but in today's world, it is no longer a rumble using fists and an occasional knife or stick. Instead, today's street gangs have immersed themselves in automatic weapons. Now you have drive-by shootings. The problems of street gangs and the associated violence and drugs are a real and growing threat to the security of the nation.⁵⁰

One of the largest street gangs in the country is the CRIPs (figure 2 shows the distribution of CRIPs to major cities across the nation). The CRIPs were originally a Los Angeles based street gang that evolved between 1969 - 1970.⁵¹ The exact meaning of the CRIPs' name has not been officially established, but one belief is that it stands for "Central Revolution in Progress," a spin off from the 1960's civil rights movement.⁵²

The CRIPs were established to make money for the individual gang members through petty crimes, school campus extortion and assorted violence. The CRIPs established a "a rapid reputation of dangerousness and violence."⁵³ Because of this, victims of the CRIPs were forced to fight, flee or establish their own gangs for protection. Soon

after the CRIPs began, other street gangs sprouted as a direct result of the threat from the CRIPs. One of the more well known of these new gangs is the Bloods.




Figure 2 - Spread Of The CRIPs Across The Nation

These other gangs which originally developed in order to protect themselves from the CRIPs, soon began to sell drugs and commit other crimes for the purpose of making money. With the introduction of crack cocaine and increased financial benefits, the violence between the gangs for drug selling territory escalated. Many innocent lives have been taken because of drive-by shootings and assorted gang violence. It was this opportunity to make money in the drug trade that has developed the street gangs into what they are today - structured, expanding, violent organizations.

APPLICATION OF THE INSURGENCY ANALYSIS CRITERIA

The Goal

The goal of the street gang is twofold. The first is the accumulation of money through illicit activities which include drug distribution, robbery, muggings, and so on. The second is security and a sense of belonging through the association with other members of the gang.⁵⁴

The Means

The street gangs do not have political means and they do not actively participate in the political process. This lack of political resources help prevent the street gangs from gaining political legitimacy in American society. As a preservationist insurgency, the street gangs do not have to participate in the political process because they are not trying to change the political system.

The forms of warfare used by the gangs include drive-by shootings, which often results in the death of innocent bystanders, mugging, robberies and other assorted domestic violence. These actions are nothing more than urban terrorism directed against other gangs, innocent bystanders and anyone who attempts to disrupt a gang's activities or takeover a gang's territory.

The Insurgent's Strategy

The strategy used by the street gangs is urban-warfare. The gangs originated in and established their territory in the urban areas. The aim of their violence is not so much at provoking government response as it is to deterring others from infringing on their area of operations. Many urban areas of America are economically and socially depressed. Accordingly, the gangs are able to recruit new members who

want to become a "roller," a gang member that has obtained wealth through the drug trade and other illicit activities.⁵⁵

The Environment

The main environment of the street gang is urban America. Cities that in the past have not had a gang problem are now experiencing one. The current social and economic problems of inner urban America have added to the problems of street gangs. The lack of jobs for the nation's youth and the breakdown of the family unit contributes to the desire to join gangs.⁵⁶ Money, protection, role models and a sense of belonging are all lures to the young to become a gang member. It is this environment that has allowed the street gangs to expand to over 187 cities with an estimated 1000 gangs with 150,000 members.⁵⁷ With such a large population, the street gangs have become the "dominant force in the socialization of the city's young."⁵⁸

Popular Support

Street gangs receive their support from the youth of the inner cities. As previously discussed, popular support is given either freely or through coercion. In the case of street gangs, the individual joins the gang because it offers protection from other gangs, provides the opportunity for wealth, or instills a sense of belonging. The street gangs popular support can be directly attributed to the environment of the inner city.

The Organization & Unity

Street gangs have a specific organization and chain of command. The CRIPs, for example have a structure that is very similar to terrorist organization and other insurgent groups. Figure 3 shows the hierarchy

of the CRIPs, which, other than titles, is similar to the organization of other street gangs. There are three specific groups of the CRIPs: Baby CRIPs, Junior CRIPs and CRIPs.




Figure 3 - CRIPs' Hierarchy

Baby CRIPs: Baby CRIPs are also referred to as Peewee and Baby Gangster. These members of the organization range from 11 - 13 year olds. Their function in the organization is to provide look outs for the older CRIPs and to act as couriers. The legal system tends to treat these individuals more leniently than the older CRIPs.

Junior CRIPs: Junior CRIPs are also known as Banger or Gangsters. These member's ages range from 13 - 15 year olds. These members are the majority in the organization. They are the "soldiers" similar to organized crime.

CRIPs: CRIPs are also referred to as Old Guys (OGs) or Rollers. Their ages range from 15 - 30 years old. The CRIPs are experienced and

are at the heart of the leadership of the organization. It is estimated that in Los Angeles alone, fifteen to twenty CRIPs control the cocaine trade.⁵⁹ It is these members that the younger want-to-be's see with money and fancy cars. They are the role models for future gang members.

In addition to the organizational structure of the CRIPs, there are other individuals or players⁶⁰ who commit crimes associated with the gangs. These peripheral players are common to all street gangs and consist of:

Hardcore: Hardcore gang members are individuals who commit crimes, dress, talk and act like the gang they represent. They are the individuals who establish the reputation of the gang.

Associates: These are individuals who hang out with and associate with the gangs in their area, but are not necessarily gang members. These individuals are made of want-to-be's.

Peripherals: These individuals are people who are seen with a particular gang usually for protection. Most females normally fall into this category. There are female gang members and in the CRIPs they are known as Crippetts. They function as carriers for the gang members' weapons and drugs, similar to the way motorcycle gangs operate.⁶¹

Each gang has its own means of communication and dress. The most interesting of the communication techniques is graffiti. Graffiti serves a variety of functions and has a very specific way in which it is written (based on the origin of the gang). These include:

- Provides a roster of gang members by their nickname
- Identifies a gang's specific territory

-Braggs about the activities of the gang, such as killings, etc.

-Sends messages to rival gangs⁶²

Another important aspect of a gang's organization is the gang's color. Street gangs associate themselves with a specific color, blue for CRIPs, red for BLOODs, etc. In addition gang members often associate themselves with designer athletic clothing. The gang's colors are their uniform, much as the uniform of a soldier. Colors identify the individual with the gang (unit) they belong to.

Extended Support

The biggest outside supporters of the street gangs are the illegal drug organizations and arms dealers. There are no outside political organizations currently supporting the street gangs of America. The street gangs, however, are reported to have extended their membership to both Canada and Europe.⁶³ As of yet this does not seem to be a major factor or problem.

CONCLUSIONS

Using the criteria established by Bard E. O'Neill on the analysis of an insurgency, street gangs can be considered a preservationist type insurgency. As a preservationist insurgency, the street gangs do not want change of any type that would disrupt their wealth from drug sale, be it from the local government or other gangs.

The gang example used was the CRIPs because they were the first and the worst gang that expanded out of Los Angeles to other cities in the United States. That is not to say that the BLOODs, the Vice Lords and Latin Kings of Chicago, the Jamaican POSSE or the outlaw motorcycle gangs are any better or worse. In fact all of these gangs have

similar background and if analyzed, could also be consider a preservationist insurgency.

The very threat to the United States society from the domestic violence associated with street gangs is real and is increasing at an alarming rate.⁶⁴ It is because of this internal threat that the IDAD model is used as a basis for combating the street gang insurgency.

VII. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT (IDAD) A MODEL TO COMBAT CIVIL DISORDERS AND INSURGENCIES

"The IDAD Strategy Is The Full Range Of Measures Taken By A Nation To Promote Its Growth And To Protect Itself From Subversion, Lawlessness, And Insurgency"⁶⁵

INTRODUCTION

The United States has supported a variety of foreign governments in their attempt to fight an insurgent force. These support operations have ranged from limited wars, such as Vietnam, to advisor and logistic support given to the countries of Latin America. Over the years the United States Army has developed a doctrine to fight insurgencies.⁶⁶ This doctrine is known as Internal Defense and Development or IDAD. The principals and functions of IDAD are not only appropriate internationally, but this section will show that they are also appropriate for domestic problems in the United States. Using the principles of IDAD, this section will show that these principles are a model that can be applied to the street gang insurgency by either the state or the federal government.

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

The basic principle behind IDAD is that the government is the primary player and that the military takes its lead from the direction of the government.

FM 100-20 states that IDAD covers a full range of activities that link together military, political, economic and social institutions to fulfill the needs of the society. In accomplishing this feat, IDAD has four basic functions. Those functions as described by FM 100-20 are:

Balanced Development: Balanced development is the appropriate use of all resources to not only defeat the insurgency, but to satisfy the society as a whole. Balanced development attempts to correct deficiencies in the system and thus deny the insurgency any points of contention.

Security: Security encompasses the activities used to protect the people from the insurgent force. It denies the insurgents access to the population and denies them the potential to gather popular support. Security also protects government resources.

Neutralization: Neutralization is the separation of the insurgent forces from the population. This is accomplished using both physical and psychological means and must be accomplished under the laws of the country.

Mobilization: Mobilization is the gathering of the resources, both personnel and material, to fight the insurgent forces. This includes those resources needed.

Along with the four functions associated with IDAD, there are four principals which must be considered throughout the campaign. These principals are:

Unity Of Effort: Unity of effort is key to any operations. All of the agencies, civilian and military, must be coordinated in their actions and centrally controlled at all levels.

Maximum Use Of Intelligence: Intelligence is critical in identifying the leaders of an insurgency, and the goals and potential targets of the movement. All available assets should be used to not only gather intelligence but disseminate it as well.

Minimum Use Of Violence: The government must be able to counter the insurgency with the least amount of violence possible. The more violence used the more the government risks losing legitimacy, popular support and control.

Responsive Government: The government must be responsive to change. Legitimate grievances must be addressed. The government must be willing to mobilize manpower and resources and provide the positive command and control necessary to lead the country against the insurgent forces.

Figure 4 shows how the principles and functions of IDAD interrelate.⁶⁷ With the functions and principals in mind it is possible to apply the principals of IDAD against street gangs.



Figure 4 - IDAD

APPLICATION OF IDAD AGAINST STREET GANGS

Balanced Development:

In the campaign against street gangs, governmental, economic, social, law enforcement, and military agencies must become equally involved. The government (state or federal) must pass legislation to provide funds for youth programs to act as a preventive measures and to show the youth that there are alternatives to belonging to a gang.⁶⁸ The Jeopardy program, run by the Los Angeles Police Department, is just one example of a youth program that is working by giving high-risk youngsters police as role models. This program keeps the youngsters

out of gangs and shows them an alternative life style to that of being a gang member.⁶⁹

In the economic sector jobs are the major concern of not only the inner city but also of the nation. Unfortunately, the lack of jobs and the breakdown of the economy has hit the inner city hardest and has resulted in the growth of street gangs. This growth in street gangs is directly related to the large amount of money that can be made through illicit activities.⁷⁰

The social aspects of gangs comes from a breakdown of the family structure which is tied in directly to the economic situation previously discussed. The problem of street gangs is rooted to the breakdown of the inner city economy and the basic family structure as more and more young people turn to forms of "illegitimate income."⁷¹

Law enforcement agencies and military must balance each other because of their individual capabilities and the Constitutional Laws of the United States. The combination of all of these elements provide a true balance in dealing with domestic disturbances and insurgency. It is this balance which provides the legitimacy of the ruling government.

Security:

Security operations are primarily a law enforcement function. In security operations, the military can provide assistance, but unless stated by the Constitution or an act of Congress, the Posse Comitatus Act limits federal forces use in law enforcement activities. An example of this occurred during the Rodney King riots in Los Angeles (29 April 1992) when federal forces were used to assist in quelling the domestic violence by providing security for the state agencies (police and fire

departments). During the riots, the street gangs were major participants and while they did not instigate the riots (at least it has not yet been proven) they took advantage of the riots to loot and commit violent crimes such as arson and muggings.⁷²

Neutralization:

Neutralization of the street gangs involved the arresting of the leaders of the gangs on charges such as narcotic trafficking, RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations), youth endangerment, or illegal weapon possession. Neutralization can be accomplished by both federal and state law enforcement agencies, with support of federal forces in accordance with the Posse Comitatus Act.

Mobilization:

Mobilization in this situation would be the gathering of not only law enforcement and military assets, but other civilian agencies as well. Mobilization would also include the use of civilians to support operations directed against the street gangs (i.e., neighborhood watch programs, youth programs, etc.).

Unity Of Effort:

Unity of effort is key in combating street gangs to ensure that federal, state and local agencies involved are conducting "mutually supportive actions to achieve a common goal."⁷³ Unity of effort does not necessarily mean unity of command. Federal troops can not be placed under the direct control of a state. However, state assets can be placed under the control of federal forces.⁷⁴

Maximum Use Of Intelligence:

Intelligence is critical to the tracking and neutralization of key gang leaders. Unity of effort is virtually impossible unless a solid intelligence system is established. The intelligence assets must be focused and directed towards the accomplishment of the common goal. The F.B.I. has already initiated a restructuring of its resources to identify and track gang members.⁷⁵ For example, Sergeant Wes McBride of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department has documented over 80,000 local gang members to include proper names, aliases and criminal records. He has been able to provide important information to other cities throughout the country.⁷⁶ Federal forces are prohibited by law from actively participating in the intelligence collection on American citizens, however, the federal forces can supply the equipment and they can function as the clearing house for receiving and distributing information on gang members.

Minimum Use Of Violence:

Minimum use of violence is key to maintaining law and order. This does not mean that a city, state or nation should not be prepared to use maximum force. If the street gangs and the local citizens realize that maximum force could be used, then it is likely that it will not be needed. An example of this occurred during 1960 riots in Toledo, Ohio when the Police Chief told his people to "Arrest every lawbreaker you can - and meet illegal force with legal force!"⁷⁷ The emphasis was on a heavy show of force and the ability to use force if necessary. The results of this situation was that the Toledo police forces and the Ohio National

Guard were able to quickly restore order, while other areas such as Detroit and Newark burned.⁷⁸

Responsive Government:

The state and federal governments must be responsive in two ways. The first is the identification of the root causes of the street gang insurgency and the second is in the mustering of forces to deal directly with the domestic violence associated with the gangs. The identification of the root causes of the street gang problem is critical in the government's ability to implement programs to correct the problems. The mustering of overwhelming force to deal with the domestic violence eliminates the "implied official permission for criminals and rowdies to coalesce and rebel"⁷⁹. It shows that the state or federal government means business and, as in the Toledo riots, can be a very effective tool.

After applying the principles of IDAD to the street gang insurgency, a plan to combat the problem can be established. The key question at this time is whether or not the campaign should be a state run operation supported by federal forces or a nationally run operation controlled by federal forces and the Department of Defense. The answer to this question involves the Constitutional laws, and the overall threat to the nation from street gangs.

NATIONAL OR STATE PROGRAM?

The threat to the United States in terms of an increase in domestic violence from street gangs is real.⁸⁰ The statistics involving violent crimes and illegal drugs are real and are growing at an alarming rate. The violence associated with street gangs is no longer restricted to the

inner cities. Rural America is starting to feel the affects from crime directly related to street gangs.⁸¹ The major factors that limit a national military campaign against street gangs are the following:

1. Even though street gangs are a form of insurgency, they are disorganized at the national level and lack outside support. Should the spread of gangs become organized under one controlling individual, with outside support from sources such as terrorist or narcotic organizations or foreign powers not friendly to the United States, then this could become a national problem requiring a national plan.

2. The street gangs have no political legitimacy and as such do not threaten the American democratic system. The possibility of street gangs establishing any form of political legitimacy is virtually nonexistence. This summer, street gang leaders are planning on meeting in Kansas City to discuss ways to prevent violence. This is a step in an attempt to establish social legitimacy on the part of the gang members. As it stands right now, street gangs have a major influence on the social development of our city's youth⁸² and because of this any form of legitimacy could be disastrous, especially considering the violent nature of gangs.

If the one or both of the above two points existed, than the President could justify the use of federal forces to combat the insurgency at the national level, providing the appropriate laws are followed. The authority for this action would come from Article II, section 3, to enforce the laws of the federal government and Article IV, section 4, to protect the States from domestic violence (if requested by the State). The Posse Comitatus Act would not necessarily limit the use of federal forces

because of the Constitutional clause in the Posse Comitatus Act. The only limiting factor in conducting a national level plan is intelligence gathering. The military forces would need support from state and federal agencies in the collecting of domestic intelligence as well as basic law enforcement activities.

The street gang insurgency is a state by state problem. As such, the states could be supported by federal forces under the same laws.

In either of the above situations (federal or state campaign plan), the command and control structure for federal forces would be the same. Figure 5⁸³ shows how the federal forces could be controlled when used domestically.




Figure 5 - Command And Control Of Federal Forces

CONCLUSIONS

IDAD provides a solid model for developing the basis for a campaign plan. The idea of balanced development and the state or federal government taking the lead in any counterinsurgency operation is critical for maintaining the legitimacy of the political institution.

The other important factor in conducting operations against domestic insurgencies is maintaining the legality of the Constitution. In this situation, based on the analysis of the street gangs from the previous section, military operations are supported under article II, section 3 and the fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. In addition, Article IV, section 4 could also be applied should the States request assistance.

VIII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

"What Began As A Los Angeles Problem Has Become A National One."⁸⁴

INTRODUCTION

This study has looked at the laws that affect the use of federal forces to deal with domestic disturbances. The Constitution provides three specific articles or amendments that give the President the power to use federal forces within the United States. In addition, there are two unwritten laws that provide additional flexibility in the internal deployment of forces. To balance out the five situations for the use of federal forces, there exist two laws that limit the President's power, with the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 being the most prominent.

Based on the analysis using Bard E. O'Neill's criteria and information found in FM 100-20, street gangs are in fact a form of a preservationist insurgency. IDAD provides a model from which a campaign plan could be developed at either the state or national level to combat this domestic insurgency.

RAMIFICATIONS

There are two ramifications associated with this study. First, this problem will not be solved overnight. IDAD is a long term solution to a problem that has evolved over time. Secondly, setting the precedent of having the military become a major player in domestic issues and problems. This precedent could force the military to concentrate more on issues not associated with warfighting and weaken its ability to fight and win wars.

FINAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The poor economy and social demographics in our inner cities have lead to a breakdown of the family unit, which in turn has resulted in the recruitment of the nation's youth to street gangs. Membership in gangs provides money, protection and a sense of belonging. Fighting this problem will require not just more law enforcement officials, but a complete balanced package of political, economic, military and social actions provided by the IDAD model.

Street gangs are a form of insurgency. Hence, the IDAD model provides a basis for the development of a successful campaign plan. While street gangs and the associated domestic violence is a threat to the United States, it is not an organized military or political threat, that is unified under one individual. Rather, it is a state problem that may

require federal assistance in the forms of law enforcement, economic aid, social aid and military support.

The relevance of street gang violence for the United States military escalates as gangs get bigger and bigger, and the ability of the states to control sudden violence, especially riots, becomes more and more tenuous. As a result federal military forces may find themselves having to become more and more involved with conducting operations in a domestic environment.

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⁴ Ibid., 8.

⁵ Ibid., 8.

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⁷ Ibid., 15.

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⁹ Seth Mydans, "F.B.I. Setting Sights on Street Gangs," *New York Times*, 24 May 1992, Sec 1, p 16, col 1.

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³⁸ Ibid., 22.

³⁹ Ibid., 23.

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⁶⁰ Ibid., 99.

⁶¹ Ibid., 99.

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⁶³ Robert McGarvey, "Gangland: L.A. Super Gangs Target America," *The American Legion*, March 1991, Vol. 130, No. 3, 25.

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⁷⁰ Joan Moore, "Gangs and Gang Violence What We Know and What We Don't", *Gang Violence Prevention*, 34.

⁷¹ Elliott Currie, "Comments on the Social and Economic Context of Violence in Minority Communities", *Gang Violence Prevention*, 21.

⁷² Sylvester Monroe, "Life In The Hood", *Time*, 15 June 1992, 38.

⁷³ *Field Manual 100-20*, E-2.

⁷⁴ Andrew Mansinne Jr. and Walter B. Schlotterbeck, *The Role of the Department of Defense in Civil Disturbances*, 22.

⁷⁵ Seth Mydans, "F.B.I. Setting Sights On Street Gangs", *The New York Times*, 31 May 1992,

⁷⁶ Robert McGarvey, "Gangland: L.A. Super Gangs Target America," *The American Legion*, March 1991, Vol. 130, No. 3, , 26.

⁷⁷ Eugene H. Methvin, "A Riot Primer," *National Review*, 10 June 1991, 31.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁸⁰ Joseph R. Biden, *Fighting Crime in America: An Agenda for the 1990's*, 1.

⁸¹ *Time*, 38.

⁸² Brent Staples, "The War Against Street Gangs," *The New York Times*, 31 May 1991, Sec 4, p 18, col 1.

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